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Chapter 2
Wilhelm Dilthey and the  
Formative-Generative Imagination
Eric S. Nelson
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) is well-known as a philosopher and intellectual 
historian who prioritized the formative force and significance of the imagi-
nation in his popular and philosophical writings, such that he is accordingly 
identified as an heir to German Idealism and romanticism in a naturalistic and 
scientistic epoch.1 His works have been judged by subsequent hermeneutical 
thinkers, such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, as being ambiguously torn between 
a positivistic empiricism and an intuitive holistic romanticism (Gadamer 
1985: 157–82). The position of the formative-generative imagination, the 
imagination as a constitutive structural element in the dynamic formation of 
the sense of a whole, in the development of Dilthey’s thought clarifies this 
ostensive inconsistency. Dilthey repeatedly asserted that knowledge is intrin-
sically experiential and empirical. Forms of knowledge and science proceed 
from elementary experiences and logical operations, as Dilthey described in 
diverse ways from his early Introduction to the Human Sciences (Einleitung 
in die Geisteswissenschaften: Versuch einer Grundlegung für das Studium 
der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte, 1883) through his middle writings on 
psychology and aesthetics to his later Formation of the Historical World in 
the Human Sciences (Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswis-
senschaften, 1910).
Dilthey’s philosophical works on the nature and limits of the human 
sciences, descriptive and analytic (interpretive) psychology, and herme-
neutical and historical understanding gave the imagination a central sys-
tematic role in how subjects understand themselves and others in ordinary 
common life as well as in how individual and collective subjects—which 
have a relative and conditional identity and validity yet no substantial 
essence for Dilthey—are interpreted in human scientific formations. Dilthey’s 
popular writings in intellectual and literary history, particularly his widely 
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read biographical sketches of eminent German poets in Lived-Experience 
and Poetry (Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, 1907), depict and praise—to the 
point of exaggeration criticized by subsequent thinkers such as Adorno in his 
aesthetics—the heightened imaginative phantasy (Phantasie) and feeling of 
life (Lebensgefühl) expressed through the works of Lessing, Goethe, Novalis, 
and Hölderlin.2
While Dilthey emphasized the priority of experience, accordingly lending 
support to the claim that he can be categorized in a German tradition of empir-
icism, elementary experiences occur within contexts of signification that they 
presuppose and are enacted in a holistic nexus of differentiating structural 
relations.3 In the same way as Dilthey’s psychological works substituted the 
Kantian idea of an atemporal transcendental subjectivity with the differenti-
ating development and enactment of a temporally mediated structural whole 
of the “acquired psychic nexus” (erworbener seelischer Zusammenhang), his 
analysis of the structural-contextual conditions of experience—that Dilthey 
construed as a transformation of Kant’s static intellectualistic a priori—
stressed the centrality of the imagination within the formation of experience 
itself and its elucidation.4
Dilthey’s discourse of the imagination is most appropriately described in 
its own language as creative (schaffende or schöpferische) and formative- 
generative (gestaltende). This approach both modifies and presents an alterna-
tive to concepts of the productive and transcendental imagination that Dilthey 
interprets as overly idealistic in his historical portrayals of German Idealism 
and Romanticism.5 Dilthey rarely explicitly mentioned the Kantian concept 
of the productive imagination (produktive Einbildungskraft) except in histori-
cal discussions of Kant and Fichte, as in his Schleiermacher biography (see 
Dilthey 1970a: 251; 1997b: 8). Elsewhere, in the manuscript of the “Basel 
Logic” of 1867–1868, Dilthey explicitly dismissed Fichte’s foundationalist 
argumentation from the ego, including its use of the productive imagina-
tion, as erroneous and sophistical (Dilthey 1990: 74). Nonetheless, Dilthey’s 
philosophy of the imagination can be interpreted as a posttranscendental 
appropriation and reinterpretation of the productive imagination that contex-
tualizes it in relation to worldly receptivity and responsiveness as well as the 
structural wholes in which it operates. Dilthey’s imagination is a related yet 
distinctive conception of the creativity of the imagination, which he at times 
describes in terms of a productive freely formative phantasy (eine produktive 
freigestaltende Phantasie).6 The imagination reconfigures, within the context 
of its enactment, previously given elements and contents and completes them 
into new wholes of signification. A rethinking of the imagination and its “pro-
ductivity” emerges across Dilthey’s works in which the constitutive forces 
of the imagination are reinterpreted in formative-generative and dynamic 
structural-holistic terms.
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Johann Wolfgang von Goethe noted in his 1792 essay “The Experiment 
as a Mediator between Object and Subject” how “although arguments may 
deal with utterly separate matters, wit and imagination can group them 
around a single point to create a surprising semblance of right and wrong, 
true and false” (Goethe 1998: 16). Imagination completes cognition in form-
ing a holistic intuitive perception (Anschauung) of the object. Dilthey adopts 
this interpretive strategy of the formative powers of the imagination that is 
more indebted to a critical reading of Goethe than to Kant. The imagination 
is depicted in Lived-Experience and Poetry as serving a generative role in 
human life and understanding as it provides—in structural interaction with 
perception (Anschauung) and memory (Gedächtnis)—a sense of the whole 
(Dilthey 1985: 238–40; 2005: 383–85). The imagination has a structural 
role in the formation of all experience; it shapes how human beings interpret 
themselves, intersubjectively given others, and the sense of nature itself in its 
occurrences and silence (Dilthey 1959a: 36).
As analyzed in this chapter, the imagination is not only an aesthetic con-
cern limited to the creation of fictive entities and pictures in the mind’s eye. 
It does not only play a constitutive role in interpreting art and poetry, as 
Dilthey’s aesthetics is oriented toward disclosing the imaginative processes 
on both the side of the artist and the audience. The imagination is crucial to 
clarifying the elementary processes of understanding and interpretation in the 
midst of ordinary everyday human life, the paradigmatic thinking and radical 
epoch-changing transformations of thought evident in the natural sciences, 
and the modes of inquiry found in the historical and human sciences, both 
on the side of the researchers and the historical subjects who they research.
Dilthey, Transcendental Philosophy,  
and the Problem of Constitution
To briefly outline Dilthey’s historical situation, the idea of the “productive 
imagination” as a transcendental condition that clarifies the possibility of 
a priori cognition and the imagination’s role in transcendental constitution 
were developed in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The productivity of the 
imagination with respect to aesthetic and teleological forms of judgment 
was articulated in his Critique of the Power of Judgement.7 The powerful 
systematic role given to the imagination in transcendental constitution by 
Kant inspired a generation of intellectuals, notably Fichte who identified it 
with spirit itself and conceived of it as completely creative in his 1794 lecture 
“Concerning the Difference between the Spirit and the Letter within Philoso-
phy” (Fichte 1993: 193). It would be subsequently downplayed in postidealist 
German thought, including the neo-Kantian interpretations of Kant’s critical 
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philosophy that dominated late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Ger-
man academic philosophy. Dilthey’s thinking runs contrary to this tendency 
in retaining the centrality of the imagination albeit in a modified form. He 
expresses admiration for the emphasis on how mind and imagination are 
actively involved in shaping and producing the sense and meaningfulness of 
the world in transcendental philosophy and idealism while seeking to give 
spirit’s activities a more empirical anthropological-psychological and social-
historical basis in the human sciences.8
The first modification in the concept of the imagination that needs to be 
considered is Dilthey’s relation with transcendental philosophy and idealism 
to which Dilthey is both an heir and critic. Dilthey’s thinking was no doubt 
inspired and informed by Kant’s philosophy of the imagination, as Rudolf 
Makkreel has emphasized in his Dilthey book (Makkreel 1992). Dilthey, 
however, sought to substantially revise—in a much more radical way than 
neo-Kantianism—the Kantian critical paradigm by rethinking precisely the 
a priori and transcendental elements in relation to the empirical natural (such 
as the biological and physiological study of human nature) and human sci-
ences (encompassing psychology, anthropology, history, linguistics, etc.). As 
Dilthey argued in his early major work Introduction to the Human Sciences 
(1883), inquiry into the scope and limits of human knowledge and experience 
demands recourse to the empirical and ontic study of language, history, and 
culture in which they occur and are enacted (Dilthey 1957a: 180). Accord-
ingly, Kant’s “critique of pure reason” would become Dilthey’s “critique of 
historical reason”—that is, the critique of reason as a historically embodied 
and practiced reality—and Kant’s “categories of the understanding” would be 
reconsidered as the “categories of life” that are inseparable from and modi-
fied by how they are lived and enacted (Makkreel 1992: 244).
There is a distinctive element in Dilthey’s postmetaphysical reconstruc-
tion of epistemology that prevents it from being empiricism as it is normally 
defined and that distinguishes his analysis from Hume’s appeal to study the 
mind in common life, custom, and history. A philosophy of the synthetic 
a priori either leads to the dead-end of speculative idealism, which Dilthey 
sees as a movement whose time is past, or a situated and embodied historical 
a priori that requires empirical scientific inquiry and experiential self-reflection 
to be appropriately interpreted. Dilthey’s reliance on and elucidation of 
dynamic structural wholes of relations that constitute a nexus (Zusammen-
hang) is both a transformation of and an alternative to classical transcendental 
philosophy and philosophical idealism that relies on constitution through the 
subject. There are now multiple forms of constitution of individuals, social 
forms of life, and forms of cognitively valid knowledge of human, organic, 
and physical relational wholes (Zusammenhänge) that are differentiated from 
one another through their own internal dynamics.9 Dilthey’s approach to 
individuation has been misconstrued by his critics: even while, for instance, 
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Dilthey’s philosophical project has been criticized for his individualism in the 
developing field of sociology (Simmel, Weber), Marxist inspired philosophy 
(Lukács, Benjamin, Adorno), and in philosophical hermeneutics (Gadamer); 
individuality is interpreted as the individuation of a dynamic relational whole 
that, as such, contains nothing purely unique or singular independent of the 
relational nexus.10
How then does Dilthey conceive of constitution? Dilthey can speak of 
material, organic, psychological, and “spiritual” constitution and unfolded an 
account of the fundamentally practical constitution of the world in ways that 
prefigure and shares affinities with pragmatism.11 Constitution (Konstitution) 
is not confined to theoretical or philosophical foundations in Dilthey’s usage 
nor does it have a typically idealistic or transcendental character. To consider 
a few examples: Dilthey speaks of the constitution of psychic life from its own 
elements, forces, and laws—that parallel and are contentwise distinguished 
from those of physics or chemistry—in his psychological writings and the 
material-environmental and spiritual-social (geistig) constitution of a people—
from which its conditions, needs, and ideals arise—in his writings on educa-
tion (Dilthey 1960a: 56; 1997b: 253). In his posthumously published notes for 
the unpublished second volume of the Introduction to the Human Sciences, 
Dilthey distinguishes between logical, practical, and affective constitution of, 
respectively, knowledge, will, and emotional life (Dilthey 1997a: 79).
Dilthey more frequently deploys the word Aufbau than Konstitution. It 
can be translated into English as “constitution,” “construction,” or—more 
appropriately in Dilthey’s case—as “formation.” The term “Aufbau” occurs 
throughout Dilthey’s works. He already uses the expression “formation of 
the human sciences” (Aufbau der Geisteswissenschaften) in the Introduc-
tion to the Human Sciences (Dilthey 1959a: 30). He articulates the idea of 
ethical life as an “Aufbau einer über das tierische Leben hinausreichenden” 
(a formation extending beyond animal life) in his System of Ethics and else-
where the formation of worldviews, systematic sciences, and logic (Dilthey 
1957b: 371; 1958b: 66; 1970b: 53). His primary late work The Formation 
of the Historical World in the Human Sciences clarifies how formation in 
this context is not purely logical and epistemic (Dilthey 1956; 2002). It is 
a social-historical formative-generative process involving the prereflective 
self-relational reflexivity and coming to self-reflection of humans investigat-
ing themselves. It is evident that transcendental conditions are reconceived 
as emergent structural relational wholes that are capable of further prereflec-
tively made and self-conscious modifications such as through the freedom 
and conditional creativity and productivity of the imagination articulated in 
works of art, music, and poetry that are interpreted as expressions by audi-
ences, art critics, and aesthetic theorists.
Aufbau as sociohistorical formation is not an achievement of an individual 
subject (whether understood as a lived or thinking ego) or collective subject 
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(which is only a heuristic fiction too easily reified) in Dilthey’s analysis. 
The constitution of subjectivity is a structural process occurring through the 
mediations of history, language, and social-historical life. That is to say, as 
noted previously above, the subject is formed through intersecting conditions 
and forces of life: even its singular uniqueness and individuality—which 
Dilthey claims is an emergent absolute value—in his poetics, pedagogy, and 
ethics, is due to its being a unique individuating configuration or constel-
lation of these conditions and forces rather than a self in the sense of an 
underlying soul or substance.12 Dilthey describes in the Aufbau how the sense 
and identity of the self unfolds in experiential, imaginative, and interpretive 
relationships to itself in the context of its material-environmental and social-
historical (which he calls “objective spirit” adopting Hegel’s expression) 
mediations.
Another consequence of Dilthey’s structuralism and expressivism—both 
of which have their roots in Herder and Goethe—is that he cannot be the pro-
ponent of direct or immediate introspective intuition as some scholars portray 
him; we interpret others and ourselves through mediations, objectifications, 
and expressions that allow the imagination to gain a sense of and interpret a 
person’s subjectivity and interiority (i.e., the first-person perspective).13 The 
uses of imagination and phantasy in Dilthey’s broadly expressivist account 
of intersubjectivity do not lock the other out and imprison interpreters in their 
own first-person perspectives insofar as the imagination operates within an 
intersubjective nexus rather than produces it from out of itself. The imagina-
tion must necessarily work in interaction with others in forming a sense of 
the whole—that is, in this instance, the sense of their character and personal 
identity across time—which can be modified across each experience and 
encounter.
Dilthey’s use of Aufbau should not be conflated with its deployment in 
other discourses, such as Rudolf Carnap’s The Logical Construction of the 
World (Der logische Aufbau der Welt, 1928). Aufbau can be appropriately 
translated in Carnap’s context as the construction of a system of constitu-
tion (Konstitutionssystem). There is a sense, however, in which Carnap’s 
endeavor employs a “formation” echoing Dilthey (as well as others such as 
Husserl and Driesch) in that Carnap reconstructs in his 1928 work the forma-
tion of the experiential world through an analysis of holistically conceived 
lived experience (Erlebnis) in conjunction with the categories of the new 
formal logic adopted from Frege and Russell.14
The Formative-Generative Role of the Imagination
Dilthey’s conception of the imagination is not productive in the sense of pos-
iting an a priori condition of knowing or of creating a subject and a world. 
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As two dimensions of the same process, the productivity and creativity of the 
imagination are continuous with its worldly receptivity and responsiveness. 
Dilthey rejected the priority of the mind and any faculty thereof, in favor of 
interactive cogivenness (Mitgegebenheit), or equiprimordialness, arguing in 
“The Origin of Our Belief in the Reality of the External World and Its Justifi-
cation” (“Beiträge zur Lösung der Frage vom Ursprung unseres Glaubens an 
die Realität der Außenwelt und ihrem Recht,” 1890) that self and world—as 
“being there for me”—are “given with” (mitgegeben) one another in a rela-
tional nexus that is initially prereflectively experienced through force and 
resistance.15 The world is a reflexively felt practical reality rather than an 
external object that necessitates being cognitively inferred or demonstrated 
such that it is a metaphysical illusion to believe that there is a need to prove 
and reconstruct an external world in relation to a separate internal one: there 
is the differentiation and individuation of a holistic structure into the sense of 
a self as distinct from the world.
The creativity and responsivity—and these are two aspects of one process 
in Dilthey’s account—of the imagination operate in a worldly relational 
nexus of elements and conditions that it does not create but with which—in 
interaction and in the oscillating movement between whole and part, structure 
and event, general and particular—it generates and produces meaning in its 
relational context.
In a characteristic passage about the imaginative phantasy, which exposes 
Dilthey’s continuity and discontinuity with earlier idealist conceptions of 
the imagination, he describes in Lived-Experience and Poetry how poetic 
(aesthetic) phantasy receptively and creatively produces—in interaction with 
memory and perception that it modifies and transforms—“innumerable new 
intuitive forms” through “processes of intensification, diminution, arrange-
ment, generalization, typification, formation, and transformation, which are 
sometimes unconscious and sometimes conscious and intentional” (Dilthey 
1985, 241; 2005: 389). These imaginative processes, which creatively and 
concretely stylize and typify forms rather than abstractly universalize con-
cepts, require the imagination to fuse and animate the “nucleus of the image” 
with new connections and relations through a process of “positive completion” 
(Dilthey 1985: 241; 2005: 389). Positive completion results in poetic images 
and forms that evoke reality while placing it in a different context that can 
illuminate it in new ways. Aesthetic phantasy, a thinking through images and 
forms that is a correlate to receptivity and responsiveness, thereby achieves 
a freedom in relation to its own contents to reconfigure them in meaningful 
ways. This sense of the imagination’s role in the formation of meaningful 
wholes in exemplary yet uniquely differentiated types, images, forms, and 
figures offers a clue to the function of the imagination as a whole.
As will be examined in further detail below, Dilthey distinguished varieties 
of the enactment of the imagination and phantasy. He introduces a distinction 
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between three forms of the imagination in his Poetics: the imagination as 
active in the formation of scientific hypotheses, practical moral-political ide-
als, and artistic images (Dilthey 1958a: 145–47; 1985, 75–77). Each form of 
the imagination is in this description active—and to this extent productive 
within a structural nexus—in the formation of coherent exemplary images and 
distinctive typical forms that transcend ordinary given reality in order to ori-
ent inquiry, action, and affective fulfillment. In Kantian language, the imagi-
nation provides a medium to pursue regulative ideas. But the imagination is 
not limited to a realm of orienting ideals. “Fixed forms of social life, festivity, 
and art,” according to Dilthey, disclose the function and prevalence of imagi-
nation in everyday human life (Dilthey 1958a: 147; 1985: 77). In all of these 
arenas of human life, the imagination is perceived as offering a sense of the 
whole that makes the social form, the popular festival, the work of art or 
music meaningful for me.
Showing an affinity with Hume, Mill, and associationist psychology on 
this point, the imagination is not productive in the sense of creating and pro-
ducing new content or elements in Dilthey: the “new creation of contents 
(Neuschöpfung von Inhalten) . . . were nowhere experienced” (Dilthey 1958a: 
142; see also Makkreel 1992: 163). Revealing his proximity to the empiricist 
tradition, and his commitment to the thesis of the primacy of experience, Dil-
they maintained that imagination inherently operates from “out of elements 
of experience and based on analogies with experience” (Dilthey 1958a: 
139; 1985: 68). Nonetheless, this affinity with British empiricism is itself 
limited, as the imagination is “free” in relation to the elements of experience 
and is not simply a form of reproductive association (Dilthey 1958a: 139; 
1985: 68). Dilthey’s structural interpretation of the freedom and productiv-
ity of the imagination can well be portrayed as occupying a middle point 
between the empiricist account of imagination as a form of reproductive 
association and the idealist understanding of its a priori constitutive power. 
The imagination can be described as productive in another important sense 
in Dilthey: to the extent that it borrows, adopts, and creates meaning from 
an already existing nexus of life elements to form new meaningful types 
and wholes. The imagination is stylistically active within the conditions 
of its milieu in the formation of images, forms, and types. It can freely yet 
not limitlessly modify previously generated images and types or it can cre-
atively form new images and types from previous elements and experiences.
The imagination is, furthermore, involved in the generative formation of 
world-pictures and worldviews through which individuals and collectives 
interpret the world and make it meaningful for themselves. Dilthey’s account 
of the formation of world-pictures echoes older ideas of the productive imagi-
nation in a modified structural and expansively naturalistic form. A world-
picture (Weltbild) shapes the determination of value of life for itself, not as a 
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pregiven a priori reality or value but through the dynamic structural interac-
tion of elements.16 A world-picture offers an experiential sense of the whole. 
The sense of the whole exhibited in a world-picture is not a fixed or static 
determination. Dilthey describes how it is the enactment and expression of 
subjectivity in interaction with the world, as it is confronted by internal con-
tradictions and external conflicts, including the “conflicts of world-pictures” 
(Widerstreit der Weltbilder) that cannot be conceptually resolved in favor 
of one particular world-picture or integrated in an ultimate unifying “final” 
synthesis.17
It is in this context that Dilthey, evoking Goethe’s imaginative experimen-
talism more than Kant’s philosophy of the imagination, calls on his readers to 
engage in experiments in imagination to creatively understand and interpret 
the human condition. While cognitive-conceptual thinking aiming at univer-
sal validity claims and “brings forth concepts,” the freedom of the imagina-
tion responsively, creatively, and reflectively “brings forth types” (1958a: 
136). The imagination is accordingly productive within a relational-structural 
nexus in producing images, forms, and types through its receptivity to the 
world and its free creative interaction with it.
In what way then can the imagination be productive in the revised sense 
of being structurally formative-generative? The imagination is a capacity 
to reconfigure experience by recombining experiential elements into new 
relations (new types) of wholes and parts and the general and the particular 
(1958a 139; 1985: 118). The images, types, and forms of the formative-gen-
erative (gestaltende) imagination are constitutively productive of the expres-
sion and interpretation of expression. These relational wholes immanently 
emerge from within experience and give experience sense and meaning. 
Imagination is a constitutive—albeit socially and historically enacted and 
conditioned—dimension to all knowing in Dilthey’s epistemology.
Imagination, Lived-Experience,  
and Reconstructive Experience
The imagination is a mediated yet not a derivative feature of human life and 
knowledge in Dilthey’s account. Dilthey is of course not the only philosopher 
who has argued that the imagination has a constitutive structural role in experience 
and its understanding. Dilthey’s work offers a unique and significant elucida-
tion of the formative-generative force of how the imagination is operative— 
and productive in a conditional structural sense—in all forms of experiencing 
and knowing. As the relational sense of the whole, it is structurally operative 
in the formation of the most concrete sensations (which are more typically 
interpreted as preimaginative) and, as will be argued later in the discussion of 
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scientific imagination and phantasy, the most abstract and formal of concepts 
(which are more typically construed as transcending the imagination).
According to Dilthey’s articulation of lived-experience (Erlebnis), which 
is the primary form of first-person experience from which objectively 
reproducible third-person experience (Erfahrung) is derived, imagination 
is presupposed in both Erleben (lived-experiencing) and how it is under-
stood and interpreted in reconstructive experience (Nach-Erleben; literally, 
“after-experiencing”) that inevitably occurs “afterward.” This “after” is the 
interval in which understanding seeks to respond to and interpret the other. 
As the self cannot itself immediately live or “relive” (the popular translation 
of Nacherleben that misses its very point) the other’s lived-experiencing, or 
even the self’s own experience in an unmediated or noninterpretive intuitive 
manner, the encounters and relations between self and other presuppose the 
mediating role of the imagination in ordinary life, history, and poetry. The 
poet and the historian are depicted as understanding the lived-experience of 
the other through practices of re-creation and reconstruction that require the 
imagination for “completion” in gaining a sense of the other as an indepen-
dent and autonomous whole—who is distinct from myself—with its own 
intrinsic first-person perspective and value as a person. Dilthey’s use of 
the term Nacherleben indicates the acknowledgment and recognition of the 
internal first-person character of the other’s lived-experiencing: that is, it is 
the reenactment of an experience that is not one’s own at a distance, one that 
is spaced by difference itself, through processes of perception, memory, and 
imagination. Nach-erleben—which is one element of interpretive understand-
ing (Verstehen)—can consequently be interpreted as a self-transformation of 
one’s understanding toward the position of the other (Dilthey 1977: 66).
It should be stressed that the mere use of the imagination, imaginative 
empathy, and transposition cannot reveal the immediate concrete psychologi-
cal or mental life of myself much less of others. One cannot rely purely on 
imagination to understand the life of others. Instead, rather, the imagination 
generates images, types, and forms through which we comprehend others and 
ourselves through what is generalizable (typical) and singular (atypical) rather 
than in and of itself. This interpretation runs counter to and corrects misin-
terpretations of Dilthey as a subjectivist relying on intuitive empathy that 
have missed the entire structural and morphological dimensions of Dilthey’s 
philosophy that has been articulated particularly well in Frithjof Rodi’s works 
on Dilthey (Rodi 2003). The emphasis on the structuring-structured whole is 
fairly clear from Dilthey’s own writings. As a result, for instance, Dilthey 
describes the scope and limits of imaginative processes of reconstruction and 
completion in the following way in a passage worth quoting as a whole:
When I do not understand someone else, I cannot relive the state of the other in 
myself. Thus all understanding involves a re-creation in my psyche. Where is 
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this human capacity of re-creation to be located? Not in the capacity for abstract 
thought, but in an imaginative process. Scientific operations have their basis in 
the creative imagination [schöperische Phantasie]. Imagination is an intuitive 
process in which I add to intuitive moments that are given some that are not. 
The intensity of the human imagination will differ. The power to complete what 
is given varies greatly in different people; even for the same person it will vary 
in different circumstances. The imagination is limited to a certain sphere. It is 
an illusion to think that nothing human is alien to me. Let us apply this to litera-
ture. The poetic capacity must contain a sympathy with everything human. This 
sympathy is also essential for the historian. Reconstruction is a moment in the 
poetic capacity. The greater the range of what he can re-create, the greater is the 
poet. (Dilthey 1990: 100; 1996: 229)
The Formative Role of the Imagination  
in Knowledge and Science
Imagination and phantasy play a formative-generative role in understanding. 
As Makkreel has noted, emphasizing the Kantian character of the imagina-
tion in Dilthey’s discourse, “Understanding is never just a matter of abstract 
thought. Instead, it requires the imagination to exhibit the universal in the par-
ticular, the whole in the part.”18 Dilthey’s argumentation for the significance 
of the imagination and phantasy in understanding has a number of important 
consequences.
All understanding (Verstehen), even self-understanding, presupposes 
elementary and complex interpretive activities of understanding and con-
sequently encompasses formative processes of the imagination that grasp 
how the universal is indicated in a particular and the whole is evident in the 
part. The imagination offers a sense of the whole not as an abstract universal 
concept but through particularity itself from elementary sensation, which 
requires a sense of a whole to be understood, to abstract concepts, which 
are likewise comprehensible through the work of the imagination. Dilthey’s 
“formative-generative imagination,” as a structurally modified form of the 
productive imagination, is practically and performatively enacted and lived in 
processes of understanding and interpretation within the midst of routinized 
ordinary everyday life, with all of the social forms it encompasses, and in the 
realm of complex theoretical and scientific knowledge.
Dilthey’s discourse of the imagination is a step between the classic concep-
tion of the productive imagination and twentieth-century discourses of the 
imagination. He anticipated themes—evident in Heidegger, Gadamer, and 
Ricœur—of twentieth-century phenomenology and hermeneutics in illumi-
nating the affective and imaginative grounds of experience, understanding, 
and cognitive-conceptual knowledge. Dilthey was furthermore prescient 
of the historically informed anti-positivism of Thomas Kuhn and Paul 
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Feyerabend in repeatedly illustrating, in his underappreciated writings on the 
historical development of the modern sciences, the import of the imagination, 
affective life, and social-historical conditions in the formation and progress 
of the sciences, including the physical, organic, and human sciences. Even 
the most formalized theoretical knowledge and scientific theories practically 
presuppose the dynamic and interactive enactment and practice of the imagi-
nation that is capable of systematically integrating and differentiating (as two 
aspects of the same process) the whole and the part and the universal and the 
particular.
Dilthey’s relationship with naturalism and his philosophy of the natural 
sciences are underappreciated facets of his complex philosophical project.19 
Dilthey’s philosophy of science requires the recognition of the formative-
generative character of the imagination. The sciences are not historically 
a result of a method of neutrally collecting facts, assessing purely given 
objectivities, and inductively inferring universal theories. Dilthey stresses 
how natural sciences such as physics and chemistry, as much as the human 
sciences, require the receptive and creative practice of the scientific imagina-
tion (wissenschaftliche Einbildungskraft) (Dilthey 1959a: 51) and scientific 
phantasy (wissenschaftliche Phantasie) (Dilthey, 1997b: 382).
Even in epochs that appear to be ones of ordinary nonrevolutionary sci-
ence, to adopt Thomas Kuhn’s distinction between normal and revolutionary 
paradigm-shifting science (Kuhn 2012), the sciences have not developed 
through the rigid following and mechanical application of predetermined 
rules. Normal scientific research relies, Dilthey contends, on an “art” (Kunst) 
of appropriately and at times creatively applying scientific rules and mediat-
ing empirical data and conceptual theories, as the imagination correlates the 
whole and the part and the universal and the particular in scientific knowing. 
Dilthey accordingly concludes (to return to a passage quoted in full at the 
conclusion of section 4), “Scientific operations have their basis in the cre-
ative phantasy [schöperische Phantasie]” and notes how this phantasy, which 
operates as a force of expansion and completion (Kraft des Hinzuergänzens), 
is limited (Dilthey 1985: 229; 1990: 100).
Akin to the artist, who shares an imaginative experimental sensibility, 
the scientist has a particular historically enacted and situated form of a 
cultivated and “disciplined” imagination that leads to the reproduction of 
previous results and at times revolutionary transformations (Dilthey 1958a: 
185; 1985: 115). The poetic and scientific imagination are akin in that they 
both step beyond the bounds of empirical experience to encompass and 
elucidate experience in more fundamental ways in their artistic and theo-
retical works. The poetic imagination accomplishes this by heightening and 
transforming affects and feelings, while hypothesis formation is an imagi-
native and voluntary use of logic and existing scientific theories in creative 
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theorizing (Dilthey 1958a: 145; 1985: 75). Science is to this extent itself 
an art. The art of science, like all art (Kunst), presupposes the cultivation 
of an appropriate, in this case scientific and logical, imagination (Dilthey 
1959b: 11, 174).
Science is one form of responsively and creatively grasping the natural 
world through the interaction of—structurally reconceived—the receptiv-
ity and productivity of the imagination, perception, and memory. Nature in 
Dilthey’s thought is not directly given or immediately intuitively accessible. 
Nor is it a construct of pure imagination. The human understanding of nature 
is interpretively and social-historically conditioned and demands the use of 
imagination in its various scientific and artistic forms. It is in this sense that 
nature is “silent” and “foreign” to humans, as hermeneutical socially and 
historically mediated beings, and nature demands the employment of human 
imaginative powers to perceive it as meaningful (Dilthey 1959a: 36).
Dilthey maintained the systematic role of the productive—as meaning 
creative—imagination, arguing for the analogous operation of the imagina-
tion and phantasy of the poet, the philosopher, the politician, and the scientist 
(Dilthey 1958a: 185; 1985: 115). Further, imagination is part of the enact-
ment of historically situated reason that operates through the formative and 
generative imagination and the orientation of the feeling of life in the context 
of social-historical conditions. Having established the significance of the 
imagination for reason, he analyzed the central role that art—as the sense 
of appropriateness and creative application—plays in human knowing as a 
practice.
History and the Historical Imagination
History is another form of an art and practice that is concerned with the 
bond between the singular and the universal (Dilthey 1959a: 90–91; 1989: 
140–41). It faces intrinsic limits in that it can only partially narrate and reflect 
on aspects of a complex fabric and vast totality, as it can recover fragments 
and remnants of a stratified, yet in significant ways, invisible past (Dilthey 
1959a: 25; 1989: 76).
History is a science insofar as it deploys scientific-empirical means of study-
ing the past through documents and statistics (Dilthey 1959a: 15; 1989: 77). 
The study of history is artistic since—like the arts—it demands the resource-
ful employment of the imagination and the ingenuity of the historian (Dilthey 
1959a: 40; 1989: 91). Dilthey claimed in the Introduction to the Human 
Sciences, “History was an art for us because there, as in the imagination of 
the artist, the universal is intuited in the particular and is not yet separated 
from it by abstraction and expressed directly, which first occurs in theory” 
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(Dilthey 1959a: 40; 1989: 91; compare 1958a: 218; 1985: 218). The historian 
cannot proceed through historical materials and facticities solely through 
conceptual cognition, since “there is no understanding apart from a feeling of 
value,” and the enactment and artful practice of historical science “requires a 
feeling for the power of the unique and a sense for inner connections among 
ideas.”20 The historical imagination does not intentionally create or produce 
new worlds; it creatively/responsively encompasses and illuminates historical 
worlds in their facticity.21
We find once again in the text that there is no sense of a whole—this time 
of a historical person, epoch, or form of life—without the participation of the 
imagination that brings individual facts together and makes them meaningful 
to the historian and the historian’s audience. A sense of a whole is a necessary 
yet potentially changing and moving point in the hermeneutical oscillation of 
understanding and interpretation that reconfigures that very whole. The pro-
cess of understanding requires the interpreter participating in it by the activity 
of his or her own imagination. There are pathologies of the imagination in 
which one can be lost in imagery and phantasy. The historian can distort and 
misuse sources through the imaginative projection of a limited or distorting 
whole. However, without the imagination, as Dilthey critically wrote of the 
historian Schlosser in his early 1862 essay “Friedrich Christoph Schlosser 
and the Problem of Universal History,” one “does not do justice to the rich 
life of the spirit, not even to the forces that actually influence human political 
action” (Dilthey 1960c: 161; 1996: 321).
As Makkreel notes, Dilthey “treats the poetic imagination and the his-
torical imagination, not merely as parallel, but as basically akin” (Makkreel 
1992: 26). Let us now turn to this exemplary incarnation of the receptivity 
and creativity of the imagination.
The Poetic Imagination
Adopting a thesis from Schleiermacher, Dilthey maintained that imagination 
and art characterize all knowing, even as the aim of knowledge is truth: “The 
production of an individual combination is art in the narrower sense, and 
its faculty is the imagination. In all knowing there is art and in all art there 
is knowing” (Dilthey 1996: 695). Whereas the imagination finds its proper 
scope in both scientific inquiry and artistic expression, the theoretical imagi-
nation exceeds its bounds when it becomes speculative or metaphysical and 
claims to cognitively comprehend the whole as a systematic totality (Dilthey 
1959a: 359). It is in this sense that Dilthey’s project of a critique of histori-
cal reason is a transformation of epistemology and the question arises, “How 
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does a contingent and conditional subject relying on its affective, cognitive, 
and voluntary capacities, and faced with its dispersion and exteriority in the 
world, achieve ‘truth’?”
As art, history, religion, and the sciences themselves show, truths appear 
in conditional ways without an accessible ultimate foundational principle or 
criterion. Here again we see the extent to which Dilthey shares affinities with 
the empiricism and psychological concerns of Hume and Mill rather than 
German transcendentalism and Idealism.
As long noted in the reception of Dilthey, his poetic-aesthetic and psy-
chological works are closely intertwined. His writings on poetry and poets 
focus on the imagination of the poet in relationship to contemporary “his-
torical, psychological, and psycho-physical” inquiry in projects such as the 
systematic work The Imagination of the Poet: Elements for a Poetics (Die 
Einbildungskraft des Dichters: Bausteine für eine Poetik, 1887). In his 1886 
lecture “Poetic Imagination and Madness” (“Dichterische Einbildungsk-
raft und Wahnsinn”), he rejected the traditional identification between the 
poetic and madness, contrasting it with the healthy and balanced creativity 
of Goethe and Schiller. Dilthey differentiates in this lecture how the imagi-
nation includes, excludes, heightens, diminishes, and integrates the play of 
feelings: the artist engages in a “free play” of the forces and images of the 
imagination, forming and expressing a new work. Dilthey’s popular account 
of poets likewise focused on the imaginative process: for example, “Goethe 
and the Poetic Phantasy” (“Goethe und die dichterische Phantasie,” 1910), in 
which Goethe is interpreted as the exemplary modern example of the type of 
the healthy balanced creative imagination that can create exemplary lasting 
characters and types. The poet does not merely express life and the forces 
of life but receptively and productively reconfigures them into meaning-
ful value-giving wholes that illuminate and orient that life (Dilthey 1985, 
237–38; 2005, 382–83).
Dilthey against Psychologism and Subjectivism
The close proximity between psychology and poetics in Dilthey’s aesthetic 
writings, in which psychology operates as a foundational human science for 
other human sciences such as aesthetics, has led critics such as Adorno, par-
ticularly based on Dilthey’s popular aesthetic writings, to argue that Dilthey 
conflated the image in the work of art with the psychological image in the 
mind of the artist. Dilthey’s aesthetics is often portrayed as a continuation 
of Romanticism in life-philosophical form that—due to the emphasis on 
feeling, imagination, phantasy, and the free responsiveness of the self—is 
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incompatible with the social critical realism and naturalism that emerged in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. Theodor Adorno argues against 
Diltheyian aesthetics in his Aesthetic Theory:
Aesthetic images are not fixed, archaic invariants: Artworks become images in 
that the processes that have congealed in them as objectivity become eloquent. 
Bourgeois art-religion of Diltheyian provenance confuses the imagery of art 
with its opposite: with the artist’s psychological repository of representations. 
But this repository is itself an element of the raw material forged into the art-
work. (Adorno 2014: 118)
Already in Dilthey’s Poetics, which posits the poetic imagination as the point 
of departure for poetics, Dilthey describes how this imagination is subject 
to its own structural conditions: “The poet’s imagination is historically con-
ditioned, not only in its material, but also in its technique” (Dilthey 1958a: 
127; 1985: 54). The Three Epochs of Modern Aesthetics and Its Present Task 
(Die drei Epochen der modernen Aesthetik und ihre heutige Aufgabe, 1892) 
further indicates how problematic Adorno’s assessment is even within aes-
thetics. Dilthey articulated the character and scope of the human science of 
aesthetics as an exemplary science of such structural relations. In this context, 
aesthetic imagination, in a limited sense, is defined as the capacity for artistic 
production and the capacity to re-create the other’s (the artist’s) lived experi-
ence through the exteriority of its expression.
Dilthey rejected “aestheticism,” “art for art’s sake,” as it separated beauty 
from historically embodied lived experience.22 Nonetheless, poetry and art 
provide the most vivid and poignant insights of life and expression. They are 
closest to and most expressive of the self-presentation of life in its textures, 
fullness, and complexity (Dilthey 1960b: 26).
Artistic works do not merely express the psychological intention or subjec-
tive interiority of the artist as Adorno inaccurately contends against Dilthey. 
They are dynamic structural relational wholes, in which the imagination plays 
a role: it can, within the possibilities and limits of its social-historical world, 
heighten and intensify life and disclose further possibilities that are invis-
ible and unheeded in ordinary conventional life. The writer can challenge 
the existing order or bring its injustices into question as Dilthey notes of the 
idealist poet of freedom Schiller to later naturalistic writers, such as Charles 
Dickens, in his own time. Although literary naturalism preferred to present 
itself as an empirical scientific description of the facts of the world, Dilthey 
recognizes how naturalistic authors employ the imagination to productively 
stylize and typify experiences and the world. Whether it is Schiller or Dick-
ens, the literary author can receptively encounter and trace phenomena in 
order to creatively modify, enliven, and complete an image from the ele-
ments given by the world (Dilthey 1958a, 212–13; 1985: 142–43). Art is the 
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strongest expression of the freedom and productivity of the imagination, as it 
can address and encounter the singular without destroying it in a noncoercive 
juxtaposition of singulars such that art is higher than any science.23
Aesthetics serves as an exemplary model for the human sciences. Dilthey 
clarifies why aesthetics is a model human science in The Imagination of the 
Poet: Elements for a Poetics:
The poetic formative process, its psychological structure, and its historical 
variability can be studied especially well. The hope arises that the role of psy-
chological processes in historical products will be explained in detail through 
poetics. Our philosophical conception of history was developed from literary 
history. Perhaps poetics will have a similar significance for the systematic study 
of historical expressions of life. (Dilthey 1958a: 109; 1985: 36)
Dilthey’s writings on poetics indicate how idealist and romantic conceptions 
of the creative and productive imagination of artists and artistic genius can 
be redescribed through the experientially descriptive and structural-relational 
analytic psychology of the imagination. It is an example of the imagination 
in general, as it varies psychological, logical, and other structures rather than 
being different in kind. Nonetheless, despite this scientific psychological 
dimension, this is not a reductive naturalistic approach to artistic imagination. 
It is a phenomenologically descriptive and structurally analytic psychology 
rather than purely causal-explanatory, that is to say, a psychology appropri-
ate to social-historical individuals and the use of types, norms, and intentions 
that require the work and freedom of the imagination in their formulation 
and application.24 Dilthey’s works can still be appreciated for how they 
intertwine the structural study of the creative and productive powers of the 
imagination—and its cultivation through forms, rules, and techniques—with 
the intimacy of biographically understanding the hermeneutical situation and 
life of the artist.25
Conclusion
Stanley Corngold has portrayed Dilthey’s approach as unfolding a poetics 
of force and forces (Corngold 1981: 301–37). The forces and conditions of 
life play no doubt a crucial role, as do their intensification and diminishment, 
exclusion and inclusion. But Dilthey is clear that the factical forces of life by 
themselves lead to an impoverished poetics. The poet leaps beyond and ahead 
of the forces and conditions of life as a seer and visionary of humanity (Seher 
der Menschheit, which is used in the title of the unfinished planned work 
from 1895 eventually published as Dilthey 2006). The poet interpretively 
integrates and creatively reimagines social-historical forces and conditions, 
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both real and unreal, painful and joyous. The poet can receptively and pro-
ductively reconfigure elements into new meaningful relational wholes. In 
this sense, there is an analogy between poetry and pedagogy, as the educa-
tion of the forces of life. A poetics of self-formation in self-cultivation and 
educational formation (Bildung) is developed in Dilthey’s Pedagogy (Dilthey 
1960a). There is in this context a significant connection between Bildung and 
Einbildung that clarifies the vital yet conditional role of the imagination in 
life and in its cultivation.
Dilthey established the systematic exemplary role that aesthetics and poet-
ics play in articulating the character, scope, and boundaries of the human 
sciences (see Makkreel 1992: 15, 78). As we have seen, the imagination is 
neither limited to the aesthetics of nature and artworks nor to a merely sub-
jective realm. It is structurally crucial to understanding the modes of inquiry 
found in history and the human sciences, the rethinking of paradigms and 
radical epoch-changing transformations of thought evident in the historical 
development of the natural sciences, and the elementary processes of under-
standing and interpreting others in ordinary mundane human life.
Recognizing the significance of the formative-generative imagination—
as a transformation of and an alternative to classic transcendental and 
idealist theories of the productive imagination—for an adequate conception 
and appropriate employment of reason, Dilthey critically situated reason 
in relation to the imagination, which forms its very freedom and creativity 
beyond the repetition of concepts and rules, and explored how rationality 
is oriented by the feeling of life, and its extension and heightening through 
the imagination, in the nexus of its social-historical conditions. As argued 
in this chapter, Dilthey articulated the theoretical significance of imagina-
tive experience and the primary role of the receptive/creative processes of 
the imagination in the construction/formation of the world. His explora-
tion of the varying incarnations of the imagination—in its receptivity and 
productivity and in a structural-relational nexus—indicates its formative-
generative form.
Notes
 1. Rudolf Makkreel in particular has emphasized the key role of the imagination 
in Dilthey’s thought in Makkreel (1992).
 2. Dilthey’s most popular work Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung went through 
a number of editions and is now available in Dilthey (2005). Adorno mentions the 
problematic character of Dilthey’s use of language, for instance, in his lecture course 
on aesthetics without adequately distinguishing Dilthey’s popular and philosophical 
writings in Adorno (2009: 33, 334–35). On Dilthey’s conception of the feeling of life, 
see Makkreel (1985: 83–104) and Nelson (2014: 263–87).
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 3. On Dilthey’s relation to empiricism, see Dambock (2016) and Nelson (2007b: 
108–28). On Dilthey’s conception of structurally differentiated wholes, see Rodi 
(2003) and Rodi (2016: 51–69).
 4. On the notion of the “acquired psychic nexus,” see Dilthey (1957: 217).
 5. This approach unfolded here is informed in part by the interpretation of gen-
erativity in Dilthey in Makkreel (2011: 17–31).
 6. Dilthey applies this expression to Shakespeare’s tragedies in Dilthey (2006: 
45), where he emphasizes how the free productive-formative activity of phantasy 
relies on an established context of contents, materials, and memory.
 7. For a fuller account of the imagination in Kant, see Makkreel (1990).
 8. Compare Makkreel and Rodi, Introduction to Dilthey (1985: 14). In addition, 
it should be noted how Dilthey’s discourse of the imagination serves as a bridge 
between earlier and twentieth-century conceptions of the imagination in German 
philosophy, including Heidegger’s interpretation of Kantian imagination (compare 
Schalow 2016: 377–94).
 9. On Dilthey’s structural holism, see in particular Rodi (2003) and Rodi (2016: 
51–69).
 10. This important yet neglected point is carefully developed in Marom (2014: 
1–13). Dilthey’s oft-cited statement from the Schleiermacher biography that the 
“individual is ineffable” (Dilthey 1970: 1; 1996: 249) indicates the complexity of this 
relational whole rather than an unknowable substance.
 11. I argue for the priority of practice and practical constitution, see Nelson (2008: 
105–22). On Dilthey and pragmatism concerning the interconnection of knowledge 
and practical interests, see Habermas (1986).
 12. Note again the analysis in Marom (2014: 1–13). 
 13. On Dilthey’s indebtedness to the German expressivist transmission, see For-
ster (2010: 107–9) and Forster (2011: 195).
 14. See Carnap (1998). For an historical analysis of Dilthey’s significance for 
Carnap, and their different conceptions of Aufbau, see Nelson (2017).
 15. See Dilthey (1957: 90–138) and Dilthey (2010: 8–57). Dilthey describes how 
the sense of self and world are reflexively interwoven: “The root of self-consciousness, 
self-feeling, is primitively co-given with consciousness of the world” (Dilthey 1997a: 
171; 1989: 350).
 16. On this point, compare Horowitz (1989: 28–29).
 17. Concerning Dilthey’s conception of world-picture and the conflict of world-
views, in contrast to the idea of world in Husserl and Heidegger, see Nelson (2015: 
378–89).
 18. See Makkreel and Rodi, Introduction to Dilthey (1996: 12).
 19. On Dilthey’s interpretation of nature and relationship with naturalism, see 
Nelson (2013: 141–60).
 20. See Dilthey (1957: 336), Dilthey (1996: 255), Dilthey (1966: 638), and Dilthey 
(1996: 77). On the distinction between cognition and knowledge in Dilthey, see 
Makkreel (2003, 149–64).
 21. Dilthey describes this in the following terms: “die geschichtliche Einbil-
dungskraft . . . die ganze geschichtliche Welt in ihrer Tatsächlichkeit zu umfassen” 
(Dilthey 1970b: 281).
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 22. Note the argument developed against the critique of Dilthey’s ostensive aes-
theticism in Nelson (2007a: 121–42).
 23. See Dilthey (1960b: 26–27). Concerning the exemplary character of aesthet-
ics for the human sciences in Dilthey, compare the analysis in Makkreel (1986: 
73–85).
 24. On psychology as an interpretive human science, see Nelson (2010: 19–44) 
and Nelson (2014: 263–87).
 25. “Zu dem Literarhistoriker tritt der Ästhetiker, und auch er macht seine 
Ansprüche auf diese Handschriften geltend. Er möchte die Natur der Einbildungsk-
raft, ihre Formen, die Regeln des Schaffens und die Entwicklung der Technik erken-
nen. Das erfordert den intimsten Einblick in das Leben des Dichters: er muß bei ihm 
in seiner Werkstatt sitzen” (Dilthey 1970b: 6).
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